Strategic interaction over time can be modelled as an evolutionary game if the players do not systematically attempt to influence other players' future actions and if the distribution of players' actions changes gradually. Evolutionary games first appeared in the theoretical biology literature (Maynard Smith and
Price, I973; Maynard Smith, I982) but in recent years several leading game thcorists have used evolutionary games to address longstanding foundational issues of equilibrium selection and convergence (e.g. Binmore, I987-8; Fudenberg and Kreps, I988; Selten, I989). Economists are beginning to notice that the evolutionary approach has unique implications for economic applications. For example, historical accidents may have permanent effects when there are multiple equilibria, and ordinary ('complete information') Nash equilibrium may describe economic outcomes even when decision makers know very little about others' payoffs or strategies (e.g. Crawford, I99I; Friedman and Fung, forthcoming). Empirical evidence clearly is required to assess the economic relevance of evolutionary game theory.
For more than 40 years, laboratory experiments have been the predominant empirical method for testing game theoretic propositions. The laboratory studies necessarily examine strategic interaction over time. In most contexts, the subjects seldom try to influence other subjects' future actions and the action distributions change gradually.' Evolutionary game theory therefore is the natural theoretical framework. Nevertheless, laboratory studies up to the early i99oS relied mainly on orthodox static game theory to define the issues and to structure the design and data analysis.
The research reported here explores the ability of evolutionary game theory to explain laboratory behaviour. The central question is whether behaviour converges to Nash equilibrium for a variety of payoff matrices under various environmental conditions. The exploratory nature of the paper dictates a rather broad set of treatments and rather heavy reliance on descriptive (as opposed to inferential) statistics. The work includes some follow-up experiments and some inferential statistics, but the reader should expect mainly broad tentative findings rather than narrow definitive results.2
The most relevant previous research is reported in Van Huyck et al. (I992). The authors examine generalised two-person divide-the-dollar games, using laboratory procedures similar to the random-pairwise, No History, one-and two-population protocols defined below. They test the predictive power of evolutionary equilibrium (also defined below) as a Nash equilibrium selection criterion for their games, with generally positive results.
The current paper sketches the basic theory of evolutionary games in Section I, beginning with the simplest i-dimensional case of single population, twoaction linear games. Such games are classified into three types, each with a 2-dimensional analogue. The sketch then mentions theoretical and practical problems that may prevent convergence to either pure strategy (corner) equilibria or to mixed strategy (interior) equilibria. Readers familiar with evolutionary game theory may wish to skip this section.
Section II explains the basic laboratory procedures for the evolutionary game experiments, and introduces the main treatments: the payoff matrices for one and for two populations, the matching protocols (either random pairwise or mean matching), and the information regarding the distribution of other players' choices in previous periods (either provided to all players or to none). Section III presents the results, beginning with graphical summaries of two early sessions. A statistical summary of convergence behaviour in all 26 sessions then follows.
The results are largely consistent with theory and intuition about which treatments and payoff matrices best promote convergence. The limits of applicability for evolutionary game theory are probed, and apparent attempts to influence other players' future behaviour are documented for small populations (four or fewer players) and for extreme choices of payoff matrices. The results generally support the "purification' view of Harsanyi (I973) and Fudenberg and Kreps (I 993) that mixed strategy Nash equilibria are achieved mainly through heterogeneous individual behaviour rather than through homogeneous mixed behaviour. Perhaps the most surprising finding concerns the risk dominance criterion favoured in recent years by some theorists for equilibrium selection in coordination and other games (or economies) with I996] EQUILIBRIUM IN EVOLUTIONARY GAMES 3 multiple equilibria. Risk dominance fares poorly in some of the environments tested here, apparently because players' deviations are not random trembles but rather may be deliberate attempts to persuade other players to seek Pareto superior outcomes. The last section offers a summary and concluding remarks.
I. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
This section provides a brief introduction to the theory of one and two dimensional linear evolutionary games. See Weibull (I995) and Friedman (I99I, I992) for more general introductions.3 The essential elements are one or two populations of players, e.g. row players as buyers and column players as sellers; a payoff matrix (or bimatrix); and an adjustment dynamic that specifies how the state (i.e. the distribution of actions within each population) responds to current conditions. The theory identifies the (locally asymptotically) stable steady states, here called evolutionary equilibria (EE), and the basin of attraction of each EE, i.e. the set of states that converge to the EE.
I.A. Linear One-dimensional Games
Let A = ((aij)) be a 2 X 2 matrix specifying the payoff to a player choosing action i (= I for top row and = 2 for bottom row) when matched with a second player choosing action j (= I for left column and= 2 for right column). Assume all players come from the same population and perceive the same strategic situation -they all think of themselves as choosing rows. Then the second player's payoff is aji and the bimatrix (A, A') specifies the game. But it is redundant to write out the transpose A', so a single matrix A will specify a game when there is only one population.
The current state s = (p, I-p) specifies the fraction p of players in the population currently choosing action I and the fraction I-p choosing action 2. The state space is the one dimensional line segment (or simplex) S = {(p, I-p) eR2 :o p < I}. The expected payoff to a player choosing mixed strategy r = (x, I-x) when matched with a random opponent given state s is rAs'.
A central idea in evolutionary game theory is that higher payoff strategies become more prevalent over time.4 That is, the direction of change in s = 
I)
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I. C. Convergence Issues
The theory reviewed briefly in the previous two subsections uses a simple signpreserving assumption to predict the asymptotic stability or instability of various NE. Several issues arise in applying the theory to laboratory experiments. First, only modest numbers of players and amounts of time are feasible in the laboratory, not the large populations and infinite time horizon typically assumed in the theory. Friedman (I992) argues that the main substantive reason for assuming a large population is to ensure that each player perceives that his current action has a negligible impact on other players' future actions, so in effect she is playing a 'game against Nature'. To have a 'large' among others, present arguments against stability that appear to apply at least to mixed NE for two population games like Buyer-Seller. Harsanyi's argument is called 'purification' and, roughly speaking, says that players each choose pure strategy best responses after privately observing independent tiny random perturbations of their payoffs; typically an outside observer of one-shot games cannot distinguish the result of the perturbed games from the mixed strategy NE of the original game. Fudenberg and Kreps (I993) extend this idea to prove that a learning process can converge to mixed NE. The other authors propose vary different approaches that I will not attempt to explain here.
To summarise, there is a body of theory which identifies the behaviour one should eventually observe in simple strategic interactions among players belonging to one or two populations. Assuming the dynamic adjustment process is sign-preserving and convergent, the eventual behaviour is characterised by the evolutionary equilibria (EE), a subset of the Nash equilibria 
II. LABORATORY PROCEDURES

II.A. Basic Procedures
The experiments consist of 6o-I20 minute laboratory sessions using profitmotivated subjects. Payoffs are calibrated to produce average earnings of about US$io per hour per subject. Realised earnings depend sensitively on chosen actions and typically vary from $8 to $32 per subject in a two hour session. All subjects receive written instructions (available from the author on request) and about 2 hour training on the computer prior to participation in a session. Each session consists of 60-200 periods of strategic interaction among 6-24 undergraduate subjects, the players. In each period the players, seated at visually isolated terminals, review historical data and the payoff function, and choose an action from a menu of two or three possible actions. The choices of all players are sent to a central processor (a Sun workstation) that computes the outcomes and notifies all players. Then players receive updated histories in preparation for the next period. All these features are publicly announced. 
II.B. Treatments
The experiments seek to identify conditions under which evolutionary game theory adequately characterises actual play in a diverse set of simple games. Diversity is achieved by varying the treatments, or environmental conditions, across and within experimental sessions. The main treatments are the payoff function, the matching rules, and the information conditions. Table I interchange of payoff matrix rows and columns. The history box also is erased at the beginning of a new run. If runs are too short then convergence will never be clear, but if runs are too long then players may respond to boredom (or possibly to repeated matching) rather than to current payoffs. Typical run lengths are io or i6 periods, and behaviour is also compared across half-runs of 5 or 8 periods. In addition I test the convergence-related hypothesis: (7) Individual behaviour at a mixed strategy BE is better explained by idiosyncratic 'purification' strategies than by identical mixed strategies. The statistics in Table 3 are intended mainly to detect regularities for further investigation. A more detailed look at convergence for each type of game is now in order.
III. RESULTS
III.A. Overview
III.C. Behaviour in Type i Games
Recall that HD and other Type I matrices have a unique NE. It lies in the interior of the state space [o, i], and is an EE. Evolutionary game theory predicts convergence to this NE since it is an EE, but some game theorists predict nonconvergence because the NE is in mixed strategies. Row 3 of Table  3 at first seems to give support to both views because it reports a loose convergence rate of over 87 % but a tight convergence rate of less than 33 0 0. The underlying data show that tight convergence is at least 50 0 more frequent in second half runs than in first half runs, and under MM than under RP. Convergence is also more frequent under Hist than under No Hist. My conclusion is that the state indeed converges to the unique NE but that convergence can be slow, especially under the RP matching protocol and the No Hist information treatment.
Does the state converge to the NE because individual players adopt the mixed NE strategy? In that case we would expect to observe loose but not tight convergence, as in fact we usually do.8 A closer look at the raw data, however, Table 2 casts doubt on that view; it appears that some players usually play 'Hawk', some usually play 'Dove' and others switch back and forth. This is exactly the pattern that Harsanyi's purification approach would suggest if players draw the main component of their idiosyncratic perturbations once per run. The idea is that players may have slight homegrown preferences for 'Hawk' or 'Dove' and that Harsanyi's argument shows how this can lead to the mixed NE in the population.9
A formal test of the purification approach employs the null hypothesis that all players independently choose 'Hawk' with NE probability p = 2/3 in each period, and examines the one-sided alternative hypothesis that players change their action less frequently across periods. Each i o period x I 2 player run, for example, gives I 2o actions and 9 X I2 = io8 opportunities for a player to change her action. We use the standard (but not eponymous) runs test (Conover, Could this result be due merely to player inertia rather than to small differences in players' tendencies to play Hawk or Dove? Cochrane's Qstatistic (Conover p. I96) tests whether players' dichotomous actions are homogeneous random processes. In IO of I3 sessions with Hawk-Dove runs the null hypothesis of player homogeneity is rejected at the o oooI level in favour of the purification alternative that some players are more likely than others to play Hawk. Even in the three exceptional sessions the evidence on balance favours the alternative hypothesis. I conclude that the Harsanyi purification approach explains the data much better than the classical mixed strategy approach.
The Buyer-Seller (B-S) game is a 2-dimensional analogue of Hawk-Dove. Line I o of Table 3 shows a healthy 880% rate of loose convergence to BE of which about 2 are loose NE. Tight convergence is much less frequent; BE is achieved in only about 27 %0 of the half runs and of these less than ' are NE. To interpret these numbers, note first that the loose target has area (2b)2/b2 = 4 times the area of the tight target, and that the loose NE frequency (47 of 84) is more than four times the tight convergence frequency (7 of 84). Tight convergence is a bit more frequent in second half runs than in first half, and is quite rare under either RP or No Hist. Visual inspection of the graphs shows that typically the state spirals in counterclockwise towards the NE but there is little tendency to complete convergence once the state gets within loose tolerance. I conclude that the NE is behaviourally stable in the weak sense that the state typically converges to a (2/N)-neighbourhood of the NE. Perhaps decision costs (or lack of payoff dominance) preclude tighter convergence.
III.D. Behaviour in Type 2 Games
Recall that type 2 games (such as the Coordination game in Table I) The data underlying A second anomaly is that the state sometimes converges to the interior NE, an event not predicted by evolutionary (or traditional) theory.10 Overall, 24 (resp. i8) of the 94 full group half-runs converge loosely (resp. tightly) to the mixed strategy equilibrium (MNE). A closer look at the graphs of half-runs deemed loosely but not tightly convergent to MNE suggests that many of these actually represent slow divergence from MNE. Likewise, many of the half-runs deemed BE but not NE seem to represent slow or incomplete convergence to an EE, usually the RDNE.
The Recall that BoS and HD2 both are two-dimensional analogues of Type 2 games. Each has three NE, two EE at diagonally opposite corners of the square and an interior NE at the saddle-point of the separatrix between the two EE basins of attraction. Line 8 of Table 3 suggests that evolutionary theory accounts well for the BoS data. Despite the small area b2 of each corner EE relative to the target area 4b2 of the interior (non-EE) NE, 50 of the 52 halfruns that converged tightly to some NE actually converged tightly to an EE. Line 9 of the table suggests that HD2 runs had considerably more noise but roughly similar behaviour.
III.E. Behaviour in Type 3 Games
In WPD and other Type 3 games the players have a dominant strategy, so there is a unique NE (and EE) at one endpoint of the state space [o, i ]. Table  3 shows that in sessions where there are always 6 or more players in a group, the state virtually always converges tightly to a BE and loosely to the NE. Even the tight NE convergence frequency is an impressive 64%. The underlying data show that, unlike Type i and 2 games, the tight NE convergence frequency in WPD is lower under MM than under RP.
Group size appears to have a significant effect. Some WPD and PD sessions involve I 2 players that always remain in the same group and some involve i6 players sometimes split into two player 8 groups. In these sessions the mean deviations from NE consistently were small, e.g. OI2 in the 8 player split groups. Deviations were much more variable and usually much larger in sessions involving runs with smaller groups of 2, 4 and 6 players. Line i a-c of Table 4 summarise the results. The mean deviation from NE (i.e., the fraction of players choosing the dominated 'cooperative' action) rises to o028 with two 6 player groups, to 0o29 with three 4 player groups, and to 0o39 with six 2 player (repeated matched pairs) groups." These deviations are significantly larger than those for the 8 player groups according to standard t and Wilcoxon tests, as indicated in the middle columns of the table. The last two columns of the table compare the hit frequencies, i.e. the fractions of periods in which the deviation is within tolerance, using the conservative convention that the tolerance bound is b = i /group size. This convention makes it easier for smaller groups to record a 'hit'. Even so, line i a shows that the fraction of 6 player groups hitting NE is significantly lower than the fraction of 8 player groups. The hit rates differ insignificantly for 4 and 8 player groups, and are significantly higher for the two player groups. I conclude that small group " Perhaps it should be mentioned that deviations remain large in these sessions even when the players are regrouped into a single I 2 player group; the mean deviation in such runs is 0-24. This is a vivid illustration of the general tendency for behaviour to be influenced by all treatments employed in within-groups sessions.
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effects, here in the form of playing the dominated 'cooperative' strategy, are definitely present in the 2, 4 and 6 player groups. Scrambled matrices provide unsought opportunities to investigate other Type 3 games. Experiment 8 uses a matrix that has a dominant strategy which also gives the highest mean payoff; players in this session chose the dominant/Kantian action a remarkable 99 6 % of the time.
Recall that IDS is a 2-dimensional analogue of Type 3 games; it has a unique NE = EE at one corner of the square state space. The convergence rates reported in line 7 of Table 3, e.g. 30 0 loose and I0 0o tight EE convergence, at first might seem rather low. Recall, however, that the matrix entries for IDS were chosen to make convergence difficult and that the target area for a corner equilibrium is only b2. Moreover, half the IDS runs used the RP/No Hist treatment for which convergence rates generally are low. Inspection of the time graphs under the more favourable treatment MM/Hist shows a consistent tendency for the state to converge towards the EE, interrupted by occasional loops back into the interior when a player in the second population chooses the dominated action. I conclude that the IDS data on closer examination are well explained by evolutionary game theory.
III.F. Other Findings
Only one session explored behaviour in HDB, a I -population 3-action game with a triangular state space and with one corner NE (an EE with target area b2) and one edge NE (not an EE but with target area 2b2). Row 6 of Table 3 indicates loose (tight) convergence to some BE in I 9 (I 2) of 24 half-runs, tight convergence to the EE in 8 half-runs, and no loose or tight convergence to the edge NE despite its larger area. The data are sparse but consistent with evolutionary game theory.
The last four lines of Table 3 and the last three lines of Table 4 indicate the overall effects of the matching (MM or RP) and the feedback (Hist or No Hist) protocols. Table 3 indicates that tight NE and EE convergence is somewhat more frequent under MM and under Hist, and Table 4 confirms that hits are significantly more frequent and deviations from NE significantly smaller under MM. However, the size of the effects is not very impressive.
Do the evolutionary treatments MM and Hist together make much difference? Any tendency to speed convergence would be more noticeable in a two-population game, and should be confirmed in a balanced within-groups design. These considerations lead to the design of sessions 27-30. The last line of Table 4 shows that the IDS and B-S runs of these sessions had significantly smaller deviations from the unique NE and significantly higher hit rates under Hist/MM than under No Hist/RP. The BoS and HD2 runs are omitted from the table because their multiple NE make deviations more difficult to define clearly, but these data also appear to strongly support the same conclusion. For all three types of one dimensional games and their two dimensional analogues, the states reliably achieve a loose behavioural equilibrium (BE) even within the first half-run of 5 periods. Most of the loose BE are also tight BE, the main exceptions occurring in two dimensional games with unique Nash equilibria (NE). Most BE coincide with NE, and most of the observed NE are indeed evolutionary equilibria (EE). In general,12 the 'evolutionary' treatments of mean-matching (MM) and feedback (Hist) appear to improve convergence to EE. Thus the main tendencies of the convergence data are consistent with evolutionary game theory. Two of the hypotheses deserve further discussion. The seventh hypothesis is concerned with the stability of mixed (or interior) NE. It states that such equilibria are achieved not by independent randomisations by each player, but rather by slight idiosyncratic preferences for pure strategies by individual players. The individual player data clearly favour this version of the 'purification' hypothesis. The group data also lend indirect support: as the hypothesis implies, we usually do see convergence to the interior NE = EE in one population games of Type i, and less precise convergence in analogous two population games.
The fourth hypothesis is concerned with the range of applicability for evolutionary game theory. It states that players seldom will attempt to influence others' future behaviour ('small group effects') when there are at least 6 players in each group. The relevant data from Prisoner's dilemma experiments suggests that 6 is near the boundary. Cooperative ('Kantian') behaviour is considerably more prevalent in sessions which have runs splitting the players into groups of size 2 or 4, and it is especially prevalent in the runs with the smaller groups. Such behaviour is notably less frequent in sessions where the minimum group size remains above 6.
Perhaps the most surprising finding concerns another boundary for evolutionary game theory. Pilot experiments and other investigators had seemed to confirm the theoretical view that in simple coordination games with two pure strategy (corner) NE = EE and one interior NE, the 'risk-dominant' corner EE is most likely to be observed because it has the larger basin of attraction. (Indeed, Kandori et al. I 993, and Young, I 993 argue in influential theoretical papers that only the risk-dominant EE will be observed in the relevant limiting case.) My data strongly support the contrary theoretical view of Bergin and Lipman (I995) that one can bias convergence towards the other ('payoff-dominant') EE by increasing the potential gains to cooperation, even holding constant the basins of attraction for the two EE. The underlying behaviour can be regarded as Kantian. It remains to be seen whether other subject pools are as Kantian as mine, but it now appears that in some applications evolutionary game theory may have to be supplemented by a
